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Abstract
The exploit of quantum systems allows for insights that promise to revolutionise information
processing, although a main challenge for practical implementations is technological complexity.
Due to its feasibility, quantum cryptography, which allows for perfectly secure communication,
has become the most prominent application of quantum technology. Nevertheless, this task still
requires the users to be capable of performing quantum operations, such as state preparation
or measurements in multiple bases. A natural question is whether the users’ technological
requirements can be further reduced. Here we demonstrate a novel quantum cryptography
scheme, where users are fully classical. In our protocol, the quantum operations are performed
by an untrusted third party acting as a server, which gives the users access to a superimposed
single photon, and the key exchange is achieved via interaction-free measurements on the shared
state. Our approach opens up new interesting possibilities for quantum cryptography networks.
Quantum key distribution (QKD) is a technique that allows two users, traditionally called
Alice and Bob, to exchange a cryptographic key in an information-theoretic secure way. This
means that the security of the key relies on information theory and cannot be broken even by an
eavesdropper with unlimited resources. Since the first QKD proposal, the BB84 protocol [1], much
progress, both theoretical and experimental, has been made in the field. The practicality of this
technology is underlined by numerous experimental and even commercial endeavors, supporting its
development [2, 3, 4, 5].
Most QKD protocols require Alice or Bob to share a quantum state, or a direct quantum
channel, and to perform quantum operations, i.e. operations on quantum bits (qubits) that do not
have any counterpart in classical communication, such as generation or measurement in multiple
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bases. In the endeavor of further simplifying the requirements, it is relevant to investigate how
quantum the users’ operation and resources need to be, while maintaining information-theoretic
security.
A first step towards answering this question was made via the development of semi-quantum
key distribution (SQKD) [6, 7, 8, 9]. In these schemes, the quantum channel is used twice such
that one of the users, say Alice, is fully quantum, while the other, Bob, is restricted to a limited
set of operations on qubits, namely preparation and/or measurement in a single basis, reflection
and reordering. Further development has shown that Alice’s operations can be as limited as Bob’s,
provided that a third party distributes entangled photons to the users and performs measurements
in different bases [10, 11]. However, in all SQKD protocols, Alice and Bob need to provide quantum
resources, as they are required to prepare single-photon quantum states. In addition, ı´nformation-
theoretic security was proven for only a few cases [10, 12, 13] and always considering the ideal
scenario of perfect devices and infinite resources in the asymptotic regime.
Here we demonstrate that perfectly secure QKD is possible with purely classical users, who are
not required to perform any quantum operations nor to generate quantum states. In particular,
we introduce a protocol where Alice and Bob only need to perform two classical operations: the
detection or reflection of a single photon. Furthermore, we prove information-theoretic security
under the realistic assumption of imperfect devices and finite key.
In order to achieve this task, an untrusted server sends to Alice and Bob a single photon in
an equal superposition of their respective locations. We assume that the users can communicate
through a classical authenticated channel and that the server can send unauthenticated classical
messages to the users. Each user can independently choose to perform two actions: “detect” (D) or
“reflect” (R). In the former case, the photon travels to a detector controlled by the user; in the latter,
the photon is sent back to a balanced beam splitter controlled by the server, at whose output ports
two detectors, D0 and D1, are placed. When both users choose to reflect, single-photon interference
occurs at the beam splitter, with the relative phase of the two interfering photon amplitudes tuned
such that only detector D0 clicks. In the ideal case of perfect detection efficiency, when only one of
the users chooses to detect the photon and does not find any, the photon collapses into the other
user’s location. This corresponds to performing an interaction-free measurement [14, 15, 16], which
suppresses single-photon interference at the server and allows both detectors D0 and D1 to click
with equal probability. A click at detector D1, therefore, enables each user to deduce the action of
the other one, thus allowing for the establishment of a “raw-key” digit. In particular, a key digit of
“0”(“1”) is set when Alice chooses D(R) and Bob R(D). Other combinations are not considered,
as they cannot result in a detection at D1. In our protocol, unlike the majority of QKD protocols,
no use of the authenticated channel is necessary for raw-key generation. A sketch of the described
scheme is outlined in Figure 1.
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Figure 1: The QKD protocol with classical users. Our scheme can be summarized in the following four steps.
1) A quantum server sends single photons in superposition to the users at predetermined regular intervals, which
constitute the rounds of the protocol. 2) For each round, Alice and Bob randomly choose between the two actions
D and R. 3) The server measures the photon coming from Alice/Bob and announces the following results: “0”, if
detector D0 clicks, “1”, if detector D1 clicks, “v”, if no detector clicks, and “m”, if more than one click is observed. 4)
Alice and Bob only keep the key bit if the message received from the server is “1” and they did not detect a photon,
obtaining the raw key, according to the table in figure. 5) Alice and Bob communicate through an authenticated
channel to verify the honesty of the server and/or the presence of an eavesdropper.
Considering that the actions of the users are chosen at random, the superposition is balanced
and the server’s beam splitter is 50/50, the probability that detector D1 clicks, p(1), is limited to
1/8, which is reduced by experimental imperfections, eavesdropping or the action of an adversarial
server. In all other cases, the users exchange the information of their actions and detection results,
which is used for verification purposes. In particular, by checking the statistics of detection in the
case where each user sets D, Alice and Bob can verify if the received state matches the resource
state that the server is supposed to send. This state, in principle, can also have a vacuum and
a multi-photon component. The former is due to losses in the quantum channels connecting the
server and the users, the latter is due to imperfections in the photon source. In practice, after a
characterization of the losses and of the source, but prior to the start of the protocol, the server can
declare the probability of sending vacuum, one or more photons. If the users do not verify these
values, they assume eavesdropping and/or a dishonest server, and, consequently, discard the key.
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Note that it is enough that only one user, say Alice, performs the verification with the information
received from the other. This allows for a reduction in communication complexity.
The experimental set-up for the implementation of the protocol is depicted in Figure 2.
Figure 2: Experimental set-up. The regions of space occupied by Alice, Bob and the server are respectively
marked in red, blue and green, whereas the path of the photons is indicated by red lines. The server uses a heralded
single-photon source and a beam splitter (BS1) to produce the superposition state that is sent to Alice and Bob.
Each of the users controls a switch, composed of a liquid-crystal cell (LCC) at 45◦, a polarization beam splitter (PBS)
and a mirror. By switching the voltage of the LCC, the users can choose to steer the photon to a detector (D) or
reflect it back to the server (R). The server collects the reflected photons at a second beam splitter (BS2), where
single-photon interference takes place in case both users choose to reflect. The server records the detections at D0
and D1 and announces the results to the users via a classical channel.
The single photons are provided by a source based on spontaneous parametric down-conversion
(SPDC), which probabilistically generates photon pairs. One photon from each pair is used to
herald the presence of the other one, which is sent to the users. Therefore, all detections in the
experiment are in coincidence with the heralding detector, DH. The server sets intervals of 0.5
s, constituting the rounds of the protocol, in which Alice and Bob can decide to either detect or
reflect the photons. Note that this interval can be made shorter, in the order of 10−8 s, by using
ultra-fast switches and optimized bright single-photon sources [17]. At the end of each round, the
server announces the result of the measurement at its detectors. The probabilistic nature of our
source implies that, in each round, multiple non-simultaneous single-photon emissions can occur.
In some rounds, therefore, the total number of detections is higher than one. The output rate of
the source is decreased, so that the total average number of photons sent to the users is about 0.35
per round, in order to reduce the probability of multi-photon emissions.
Based on these experimental conditions, we develop a theoretical model, described in detail
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in Section E of the Appendix, in which the server can send 0, 1 or 2 photons per interval with
probabilities p0, p1 and p2, respectively. In our case, these probabilities result p0 = 0.705, p1 =
0.247, p2 = 0.043. Furthermore, we consider that the users do not keep track of the photon
detection times, meaning that, at the end of each round, Alice, Bob and the server only have
access to the number of detections they recorded. This makes our analysis also applicable to the
case of simultaneous multi-photon emission. Our model also takes into account the finite detection
efficiency of Alice’s and Bob’s detectors, DA and DB, respectively, which is measured to be 58%
each.
We measure the probability of the raw key generation, pkey, and the probability of error in the
raw key, perr, after 10
5 rounds of the protocol. The results are reported in Table 1. In Section E.3
of the Appendix, we describe and report the results of the verification procedure for the experiment.
Direct Method Direct Method Indirect Method
(full dataset) (subset) (full dataset)
pkey 1.55(3)× 10−2 1.5(1)× 10−2 1.5(3)× 10−2
perr 7.5(8)× 10−4 5(2)× 10−4 3(3)× 10−3
Table 1: Evaluation of key generation and error rates. The probabilities of raw-key generation, pkey and
error on a key digit, perr, respectively, are shown per round (in our case an interval of 0.5 s). pkey and perr are
evaluated in three different ways: direct estimation over the full data set, direct estimation over a randomly chosen
subset of 104 rounds and indirect estimation. In the direct estimation, the users sacrifice a part of the raw key for
verification procedure. In the indirect estimation, Alice obtains pkey and perr by using the information received from
Bob during the verification phase, as explained in detail in Section E.2.2 of the Appendix. This allows the parties to
avoid the loss of key digits, at a price of higher uncertainty on the estimated values, which are calculated from several
experimentally obtained quantities, each with its error. In the table, the numbers in parentheses are the errors on
the last digits, obtained with the assumption of poissonian uncertainty on the counts.
The raw key is obtained without sifting procedure, unlike in standard QKD schemes [1, 18].
To obtain the final secret key, Alice and Bob perform standard classical post-processing through
error correction and privacy amplification [2]. Based on the probabilities in Table 1, we obtain the
dependence of the final secret key rate, r, on the number of rounds, N (see Equation (C.1) from
Section C of the Appendix). This dependence is plotted in Figure 3, for different values of the
detection loss of DA and DB, assumed to be the same. The details of how the curves were obtained
are discussed in Sections D and E of the Appendix. As expected, an increase in the detection loss
degrades the performance of the protocol.
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Figure 3: Secret key rate vs number of rounds, for different values of detection loss. The black dashed
curve refers to the experimental implementation, corresponding to a detection loss of 42% for each Alice and Bob.
The red, cyan, blue, magenta and orange curves represent the calculated results for detection losses of 0, 3, 25, 42 and
80%, respectively. If the detection loss increases, the number of rounds for which r becomes positive also increases,
while the asymptotic secret key rate decreases. In the implemented case, the secret key rate becomes positive after
about 4.9× 106 rounds.
In our work, we propose and experimentally implement a novel QKD protocol allowing two
classical users to establish a shared secret key using the services of an untrusted quantum server,
which provides a superimposed single photon as a feasible quantum resource. We underline the
applicability of our scheme by providing an information-theoretic security analysis of our protocol
in the finite-key setting, which takes into account imperfect detection efficiency and multi-photon
emission from the source, and by calculating the secret key rate.
Experimentally, the main challenge of the protocol is that it requires phase stability in the
interferometer formed between the users and the server. This issue can be addressed by using
intrinsically phase-stable schemes, like Sagnac configurations [19]. In this case, however, a quantum
channel between Alice and Bob is also necessary.
As an immediate future line of research, our security analysis of finite keys in the presence of
experimental imperfections can be applied to show the same security levels for other cryptographic
schemes, such as counterfactual quantum cryptography [20, 21, 22, 23, 24], or the key distribution
based upon recently proposed two-way communication with one photon [25, 26].
In practical terms, recent progresses in bright deterministic single-photon sources [27], high-
efficiency detectors [28] and fast switches [17] promise to push our scheme towards real-world
applications.
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APPENDIX
A The experimental set-up
After setting its polarization to “horizontal”(H), that is parallel to the optical table, a single photon
is sent to a beam splitter that creates the superposition between Alice’s and Bob’s locations. Each
of the users controls a liquid-crystal cell (LCC) at 45◦ and a polarization beam splitter (PBS). The
phase retardation between the two axes of the LCC can be switched between 0 and pi by means
of a voltage signal. Consequently, the photon polarization is rotated by 0◦ or 90◦, respectively.
In the first case, the photon is transmitted by the PBS and steered to a fiber-coupled avalanche
photo-diode (APD) for detection, DA or DB; in the second case, the photon travels back to the
server. The detection efficiency of DA and DB is evaluated by comparison with a fully-characterized
transition-edge superconducting nanowire detector. The photons going back to the server impinge
onto a second beam splitter, at whose outputs two fiber-coupled APDs, D0 and D1, are placed.
The set-up, therefore, implements a folded Mach-Zehnder interferometer. The phase between the
two arms of the interferometer is set such that, when Alice and Bob both decide to reflect back the
photon, detector D0 clicks. The interferometer is passively stabilized, so that the phase is constant
for about 100 s. After this time, the phase is actively re-set to the initial value by using a piezo
transducer.
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B The single-photon source
We use an SPDC-based single-photon source in a Sagnac configuration [29], with a 20-mm-long
periodically-poled potassium tytanyl phosphate (PPKTP) crystal. The crystal is pumped by a
continuous-wave single-mode diode laser at 395 nm with a maximum power of about 20 mW. The
Sagnac loop is realised using a dual-wavelength polarization beam splitter and two mirrors. The
crystal converts a photon at 395 nm into two photons at 790 nm and orthogonal polarizations. The
produced photons are coupled into single-mode fibers: one of them is sent to the Mach-Zehnder
interferometer and the other is directly sent to an APD for heralding the presence of its twin in the
interferometer. The use of polarizers for both photons of each pair ensure that a defined polarization
state is produced, in particular |H〉|V 〉, where H stands for “horizontal” and V for “vertical”. The
possibility of simultaneous multi-photon emission from the source is ruled out by the measurement
of the heralded second-order correlation function at zero delay, g(2)(0) [30], which should be exactly
0 for an ideal perfect single-photon source. We obtain g(2)(0) = 0.004± 0.010, measured at a total
detection rate of about 15× 103 photons per round (in our case 0.5 s) and a pump power of 7 mW.
Our value of g(2)(0) is comparable with the lowest ones obtained in quantum optics experiments
[31]. In order to minimize the contribution of higher-order emissions, we decrease the pump power
such that about 0.35 heralded photons per round are sent to the interferometer, resulting into a
total effective number of detections per round of 0.2, due to detection losses.
C Assumptions and notation for the security analysis
We prove the security of our key distribution protocol assuming that anything outside of Alice’s
and Bob’s private laboratories, including the quantum server, is completely untrusted. After Alice
and Bob receive quantum states of some form (possibly consisting of multiple qubits) from the
server (or an adversary, Eve, in the middle) and perform their respective actions, they will receive
a classical message from the sever indicating a possible measurement outcome. However, the server
is under no obligation in our proof of security to report the measurement outcome honestly, or to
even perform any measurement at all. On the rounds where the server announces “1”, Alice and
Bob generate the raw key of length Nraw whenever one of them chose to detect the photon without
registering any click at the detector, while the other reflected. Note that due to experimental
imperfections and eavesdropping (or server’s dishonesty), server can announce “1” even if both
agents reflected, or both detected vacuum, in which case they do not share the same raw key and
the error is introduced. Let N be the total number of rounds of the protocol and p(1) be the
probability of the server announcing “1” when no party received a click upon detection. Then
Nraw = p(1)N rounds are potentially used for key generation. Alice and Bob may choose to use a
(small) subset of the raw key of size µ to directly estimate the statstics used to compute the secret
key rate. The portion of the raw key remaining after parameter estimation step is called the sifted
key, of the length Nsift = Nraw − µ. Let the random variables RA and RB denote Alice’s and
Bob’s respective sifted keys. Nevertheless, completing this stage does not guarantee the following
requirements for the shared key to be a perfectly secure secret key:
(i) Alice and Bob share exactly the same uniformly distributed key. The parameter estimation
step only sets the degree of the correlation between Alice’s and Bob’s random variables RA
and RB of the sifted key (it is used to establish the effects of noise, introduced either by
imperfect devices, of by Eve).
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(ii) The shared key is completely uncorrelated with Eve (including the server). Again, the pa-
rameter estimation step will only give upper limits to the correlation with Eve.
Both problems are treated classically, as they are applied to classical random variables. Problem
(i) is solved using standard error correction techniques (often called information reconciliation),
which turn RA and RB into X˜A and X˜B, such that X˜A = X˜B. Problem (ii) is solved by further
applying privacy amplification techniques, resulting in random variables XA = XB uncorrelated
with Eve, giving the final secret key of length Nsec.
The security level of the key shared between Alice and Bob is given by parameter , which
quantifies how uncorrelated the key XA = XB is from Eve or a dishonest server (for the formal
definition, see Equation (1) from [32]). The security criterion requires  to tend to zero as the
number of rounds N tends to infinity, thus obtaining perfectly secret key in the asymptotic scenario.
One can compute the sifted key rate as r′ = limN→∞Nsec/Nsif = S(A|C)−H(A|B). Conditional
Shannon entropy H(A|B) can be easily computed using the probabilities pi,j of Alice and Bob
establishing the raw key bit values i and j, respectively. Further, the secret key rate is defined as
r = Nsec/N = r
′(Nsift/N), which is the same as the sifted key rate in the asymptotic regime: since
in order to obtain good enough statistics during the verification procedure, the number µ, albeit
big, is still finite, we have Nsif = N −µ ≈ N , for N →∞. In the realistic case of limited resources,
however, where Alice and Bob can exchange only a finite number of keys, we must take into account
the imperfect parameters. Using the security criterion given by [32], let us denote PE as a given
error tolerance for the parameter estimation. One can further compute δ, as a function of PE , a
confidence interval so that the observed parameters are δ close to the actual values, except with
probability PE . Let  be the desired security of the final secret key, and let EC be the maximal
probability that Bob computes error correction incorrectly. All of these are given by the user.
Then, after µ rounds being wasted for direct parameter estimation and the proportion of qubits
used (p(1)N − µ)/N , it was shown in [32] that
r ≥ p(1)N − µ
N
(
S(A|C)− leakEC + ∆
p(1)N − µ
)
, (C.1)
where
∆ = 2 log2
(
1
2(− EC − ′)
)
+ 7
√
(p(1)N − µ) log2(2/(′ − PE)), (C.2)
and ′ is arbitrary (chosen by the user to maximize the expression but bounded by − EC > ′ >
PE ≥ 0. In the above expression, S(A|C) is minimized over all observable statistics within the
given confidence interval (so that the actual statistics of the real density operator are within δ(PE)
of the observed statistics, except with probability PE). The value leakEC represents the number
of (classical) bits exchanged between Alice and Bob during the error correction. Again, using [32],
we take leakEC/(p(1)N − µ) = (1.2)h(Q), where Q = perr/p(1) and perr is the probability to
generate opposite key bits during the entire protocol. Note that µ will also be a function of PE ,
since the smaller that is, the larger µ will be.
In order to compute the secret key rate described above, one needs to compute S(A|C) for a
given system. Before we proceed to discuss the ideal and experimental scenario, let us first define
some useful terminology.
Let us denote the Hilbert spaces corresponding to Alice’s and Bob’s equipments as HA =
span{|Dc〉A, |Dv〉A, |D`〉A, |D′`〉A, |D′c〉A, |R〉A} andHB= span{|Dc〉B, |Dv〉B, |D`〉B, |D′`〉B, |D′c〉B, |R〉B},
respectively. Here, |Dc〉 and |Dv〉 denote the states of a detector, the first corresponding to the
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case of a photon causing a click, and the second corresponding to the case when there were no
photons, resulting in a no-click. The detectors’ state corresponding to the case when an incoming
photon was lost is denoted as |D`〉. The state |D′`〉 corresponds to a loss, while |D′c〉 to a click of
the photon at a later time t′ > t when two non-simultaneous photons were emitted by the source
at times t and t′. Finally, |R〉 denotes the state of a reflecting mirror. Note that the states cor-
responding to a click, |Dc〉 and |D′c〉, and the ones corresponding to no-click, |Dv〉, |D′`〉 and |D′`〉
are macroscopically distinguishable between each other as groups of those with or without clicks;
and also to |R〉. However, the first two, |Dc〉 and |D′c〉, are not distinguishable among each other,
since in our set-up, Alice and Bob do not keep track of the detection times. Moreover, the latter
three states, |Dv〉, |D′`〉 and |D′`〉, also cannot be distinguished among each other, since without
performing sophisticated quantum measurements, one cannot distinguish whether a detector did
not click because there were no photons present, or they were lost.
The server’s Hilbert spaceHS = span{|0〉S , |1〉S , |v〉S , |m〉S} consists of macroscopic orthogonal
states modeling classical messages “0”, “1”, “v” (vacuum) and “m” (multiple clicks), respectively.
Additionally, we denote server’s ancilla system by C, spanned by the Hilbert space HC , which a
dishonest server can entangle with the photons sent to Alice and Bob to extract information about
the exchanged key.
Let us assume Alice tosses a fair coin to decide whether she will detect or reflect the photon,
and set the initial state of the apparatus accordingly, resulting in a proper mixture of the two
states, |Dv〉A〈Dv| and |R〉A〈R|, and analogously for Bob. Without the loss of generality, we can
always include the coin states into the macroscopic description of the apparatus states, such that
the purified initial state of Alice’s apparatus is
|φ0〉A =
1√
2
( |Dv〉A + |R〉A ), (C.3)
and analogously for Bob, making their joint state as
|φ0〉AB =
1
2
(
|Dv,R〉AB + |R,Dv〉AB + |Dv,Dv〉AB + |R,R〉AB
)
. (C.4)
Note that due to possible imperfect single-photon sources, and the presence of adversaries, the
number of photons present is not necessarily fixed to be one. Thus, we will use a number basis
to describe the photonic states. In this paper, we will decompose the overall Fock space of the
photons in Alice’s and Bob’s arms as Ff = span{|0, 0〉f , |1, 0〉f , |0, 1〉f , |2, 0〉f , |1, 1′〉f , |1′, 1〉f , |0, 2〉f}
⊕Fkf , where |0, 0〉f ≡ |v〉f represents the vacuum state, |1, 0〉f represents a photon in Alice’s arm
and |0, 1〉f to be in Bob’s arm. Similarly, |2, 0〉f , and |0, 2〉f , represent two non-simultaneous
photons in Alice’ and Bob’s arms, respectively; whereas |1, 1′〉f and |1′, 1〉f represent the case of
two non-simultaneous photons when the first one went to Alice’s arm while the second to Bob and
vice-versa, respectively. Fkf denotes the sub-space corresponding to the multi-photon case of k > 2
photons. The action of photonic creation operators aˆ† and bˆ†, in terms of the number basis |a, b〉f ,
with a, b ∈ N0 being the number of photons in Alice’s and Bob’s arms, respectively, is given by
(aˆ†)a(bˆ†)b |0〉f =
√
a! b! |a, b〉f .
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D Security Analysis - Ideal case
D.1 Extraction of the secret key
For the ideal case scenario, we assume that the server is has a perfect single-photon source, all the
channels are lossless, and Alice’s and Bob’s detectors are perfect, which means they have 100%
detection efficiency and zero dark counts. In this section, we assume that the users have already
performed the verification procedure to check that the resource state provided by the server is the
expected one and that the announcements of the servers are compatible with their actions (see
section D.2). Therefore, the perfect single photon state that Alice and Bob expect to be sent is
|φ0〉f =
(
aˆ† + bˆ†√
2
)
|0, 0〉f =
|1, 0〉f + |0, 1〉f√
2
, (D.1)
with |1, 0〉f and |0, 1〉f representing the photon located in Alice’s and Bob’s arms, respectively.
However, we assume that the following entangled state is sent to Alice and Bob by the server (or
Eve)
|φ0〉fC = |1, 0〉f ⊗ |c1,0〉C + |0, 1〉f ⊗ |c0,1〉C (D.2)
where |ca,b〉C ∈ HC are not necessarily orthogonal nor normalised. Moreover, as per usual in QKD
security proofs, Alice and Bob can enforce symmetry, and so, we may assume 〈ca,b|ca,b〉C = 1/2.
Therefore, we can write the joint initial state as
|φ0〉ABfC = |φ0〉AB ⊗ |φ0〉fC (D.3)
=
1
2
(
|Dv,R〉AB + |R,Dv〉AB + |Dv,Dv〉AB + |R,R〉AB
)
⊗
(
|1, 0〉f |c1,0〉C + |0, 1〉f |c0,1〉C
)
.
Alice’s and Bob’s actions on a given initial photon state are given by
|Dv,R〉 |1, 0〉 → |Dc,R〉 |0, 0〉 , |R,Dv〉 |1, 0〉 → |R,Dv〉 |1, 0〉 ,
|Dv,R〉 |0, 1〉 → |Dv,R〉 |0, 1〉 , |R,Dv〉 |0, 1〉 → |R,Dc〉 |0, 0〉 ,
|Dv,Dv〉 |1, 0〉 → |Dc,Dv〉 |0, 0〉 , |R,R〉 |1, 0〉 → |R,R〉 |1, 0〉 ,
|Dv,Dv〉 |0, 1〉 → |Dv,Dc〉 |0, 0〉 , |R,R〉 |0, 1〉 → |R,R〉 |0, 1〉 ,
(D.4)
and, therefore
|φ1〉ABfC =
1
2
[
|Dc,R〉 |0, 0〉 |c1,0〉+ |Dv,R〉 |0, 1〉 |c0,1〉+ |R,Dv〉 |1, 0〉 |c1,0〉C + |R,Dc〉 |0, 0〉 |c0,1〉
+ |Dc,Dv〉 |0, 0〉 |c1,0〉+ |Dv,Dc〉 |0, 0〉 |c0,1〉+ |R,R〉
(|1, 0〉 |c1,0〉+ |0, 1〉 |c0,1〉)]. (D.5)
Above, as well as in rest of the Appendix, for simplicity we omit writing the labels of the quantum
states (A, B, C, S and f), whenever it is implicitly unambiguous to which space they belong by
their quantum numbers (Dv, 0, 0, etc.).
Upon leaving Alice’s and Bob’s labs, the server (or Eve) will apply a quantum instrument to
the returning photon state. This can be modelled as an isometry I : Ff ⊗HC → HS ⊗HC , given
by
I |a′, b′〉f |ca,b〉C = |0〉S |ea,ba′,b′〉C + |1〉S |f
a,b
a′,b′〉C + |v〉S |g
a,b
a′,b′〉C , (D.6)
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where states from HC are not necessarily normalized nor orthogonal, and a, b are no longer cor-
related with a′, b′ due to Alice’s and Bob’s actions given by Equation (D.4). Note that since we
are assuming an ideal case, the term corresponding to the message “m” is absent from the above
equation.
We are interested only in the rounds when the server announces “1” and neither Alice nor
Bob detect a photon, and the users generate the key. Thus, while writing the state after the
server applies I on |φ1〉ABfC , we will omit writing the server’s message state |1〉S (corresponding
to announcing a result “1”). The final density operator representing the state of the system ABC,
conditioned on the event that the server sends the message “1” and none of the users detects a
photon (only the rounds used for key generation), is
|φ2〉ABC =
1√N
{
|Dv,R〉 ⊗ 1
2
|f0,10,1 〉+ |R,Dv〉 ⊗
1
2
|f1,01,0 〉+ |R,R〉 ⊗
1
2
[
|f1,01,0 〉+ |f0,10,1 〉
]}
=
1√N
{
|Dv,R〉⊗ |k0,0〉+ |R,Dv〉⊗ |k1,1〉+ |R,R〉⊗ |k1,0〉
}
, (D.7)
where the states |ki,j〉C are associated to Alice establishing the value i and Bob j as a key bit, are
given by
|k0,0〉C =
1
2
|f0,10,1 〉 ,
|k1,1〉C =
1
2
|f1,01,0 〉 ,
|k1,0〉C =
1
2
[
|f1,01,0 〉+ |f0,10,1 〉
]
.
(D.8)
Note that in general there should also be a state |k0,1〉C (corresponding to |Dv,Dv〉), but in the
ideal case, due to the assumption of perfect detectors, the values i = 0 and j = 1 are not possible.
In fact, this case would imply that both Alice and Bob detect vacuum and the server announces 1,
and can only be possible in case of lossy detectors, dark counts or imperfect single-photon sources.
The normalization constant N is the probability to obtain the result 1, p(1), when there were no
clicks at the users’ detectors, and is given by
N = 〈k0,0|k0,0〉+ 〈k1,1|k1,1〉+ 〈k1,0|k1,0〉 = p(1). (D.9)
Let us define p0,0 = p(Dv,R ; 1) = 〈k0,0|k0,0〉 as the joint probability for the event when Alice
detects vacuum and Bob reflects, and the server announces the result “1”, and analogously p1,1,
p0,1 and p1,0. Here, we use the semi column (;) to denote logical AND between two propositions.
Therefore, we can define the probability to share the key as pkey = p0,0+p1,1 and the probability of
an error as perr = p0,1 + p1,0. Further, let Q denote the probability that the server announces the
result “1”, given that both Alice and Bob reflected. Then, p1,0 = p(1|R,R)p(R,R) = Q/4 denotes
the error in the key, perr, since p0,1 = 0. In the ideal case, it is easy to see that
p0,0 = 〈k0,0|k0,0〉 =
1
16
, p0,1 = 〈k0,1|k0,1〉 = 0 ,
p1,1 = 〈k1,1|k1,1〉 =
1
16
, p1,0 = 〈k1,0|k1,0〉 =
Q
4
.
(D.10)
Note that in the ideal case, it is impossible for Alice and Bob to generate a key error corresponding
to p0,1, i.e. the case when they both detect vacuum and the server announces 1. Further, from
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Equations (D.8) and (D.10), we have
Re 〈k0,0|k1,1〉 = −
pkey
2
+
Q
8
, p(1) = N = (1 + 2Q)/8, (D.11)
At this point, we compute the conditional entropy between Alice and the adversary, S(A|C), for
the rounds where raw key bits are generated. Using Equation (D.7), the density operator, after
dropping off-diagonal terms, with |ki,j〉C〈kl,m|, for (i, j) 6= (l,m), is
ρABC =
1
N
(
|Dv,R〉AB〈Dv,R| ⊗ |k0,0〉C〈k0,0|+ |R,Dv〉AB〈R,Dv| ⊗ |k1,1〉C〈k1,1|
+ |R,R〉AB〈R,R| ⊗ |k1,0〉C〈k1,0|
)
.
(D.12)
The state |Dv,R〉 〈Dv,R|, describing Alice detecting without a click and Bob reflecting, is associated
to a shared key bit 0. Similarly, |R,Dv〉 〈R,Dv| is associated to a key bit 1. Whereas, |R,R〉 〈R,R|
corresponds to errors in the key, when the two users establish opposite key bit values.
Therefore, using [33] to compute a bound on the conditional entropy S(A|C), we have
S(A|C) ≥ 〈k0,0|k0,0〉+ 〈k1,1|k1,1〉N
[
h
( 〈k0,0|k0,0〉
〈k0,0|k0,0〉+ 〈k1,1|k1,1〉
)
− h(λ0)
]
, (D.13)
where h(·) is the binary Shannon entropy, and
λ0 =
1
2
1 +
√
(〈k0,0|k0,0〉 − 〈k1,1|k1,1〉)2 + 4Re2 〈k0,0|k1,1〉
〈k0,0|k0,0〉+ 〈k1,1|k1,1〉
 . (D.14)
Note that in Equation (D.13), in general there exists additional term corresponding to 〈k0,1|k0,1〉
and 〈k1,0|k1,0〉 (when the agents establish oppostite keys), but in our case it is zero, as 〈k0,1|k0,1〉 = 0.
In Figure 4, we present the dependence of the secret key rate r on the total number of rounds
N for different values of Q (including the one obtained from the experimental set-up). Other
parameters are taken from [32] as  = 10−5, EC = 10−10 and ′ = 10−7. We also assume PE =
10−11.
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Figure 4: The secret key rate r is plotted against N , for the ideal case of perfect single-photon
sources and detectors. The blue, green and magenta curves correspond to the values of Q to be
0.005, 0.025 and 0.05, respectively. Whereas, the red curve represents the experimentally observed
value of Q, 0.015.
D.2 Verification
In this section, we describe the verification procedure that Alice and Bob perform in the ideal case
to check for eavesdropping or server’s dishonesty. First, the users need to check whether the state
they receive is the expected resource state. In order to do this, they can consider only the cases
where at least one of them decided to detect the photon and registered a click at their respective
detectors. For these cases, the following conditions must be satisfied:
• The total number of clicks registered by Alice and Bob at their respective detectors must be
exactly one.
• The probability that Alice detects a photon must be the same as the probability that Bob
detects a photon, and both must be 12 .
Note that as these cases always involve a detection at Alice’s or Bob’s detectors, they do not imply
any sacrifice of key digits. After that, Alice and Bob can decide to check the honesty of the server
by verifying the compatibility of its announcements with their actions, as described in table 2. This
case implies the discard of some key digits. During this verification stage Alice and Bob can directly
estimate Q (by estimating p1,0 = Q/4) and use it to obtain the secure key rate, as explained in the
previous section.
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Alice’s actions Dc Dv Dc Dv R R R
Bob’s actions Dv Dc R R Dc Dv R
Server’s message v v v 0/1 v 0/1 0
Table 2: Announcements of an honest server. The table reports the expected messages from the server for each
possible configuration of Alice’s and Bob’s set-ups. By sacrificing some key digits, Alice and Bob can check if the
announcements of the server follow this table and thus verify its honesty. In all cases where the server can announce
either “0” or “1”, the two events must occur both with probability 1
2
. In the RR case, the server is supposed to
always announce “0”. The cases where this does not happen lead to errors in the key. The error rate can then be
estimated by Alice and Bob and used to obtain the secure key rate.
E Security Analysis - Experimental Implementation
E.1 Extraction of the secret key
In this section we analyze the experimental implementation of our protocol with imperfect single-
photon sources and detectors, as well as the noisy and lossy channels. We assume an untrusted
server that can attack before Alice and Bob perform their respective operations, as well as after
(which is equivalent to allowing Eve to intercept the photons exchanged between an honest server
and the agents). We consider a probabilistic single photon source, emitting vacuum state with prob-
ability p0, single photons with probability p1, and two non-simultaneous photons with probability
p2, within a time slot of interval T , as
|φ0〉f =
√
p0 |v〉f +
√
p1
T
∫ T
0
aˆ†(t) |v〉f dt+
√
p2
T
∫ T
0
∫ T
0
(
aˆ†(t)aˆ†(t′)√
2
|v〉f
)
dt dt′, (E.1)
where aˆ†(t) and aˆ†(t′) represent photon creation at times t and t′ > t, respectively. In our particular
implementation, the probability to emit higher numbers of photons is considered negligible and
therefore not included in the analysis, i.e., p0 +p1 +p2 ≈ 1. Furthermore, we consider that, instead
of the above initial photon state, the untrusted server sends the following state of photons entangled
with the ancilla,
|φ0〉fC =
√
p0 |v〉f |dv〉C +
√
p1 |1〉f |d1〉C +
√
p2 |2〉f |d2〉C , (E.2)
where |v〉f is the photon vacuum state, |1〉f = aˆ†(t) |v〉f , |2〉f = aˆ†(t)aˆ†(t′) |v〉f , and the ancilla
states are |di〉C ∈ HC . After passing through the first 50/50 beam splitter of our interferometer,
described by aˆ†(t)→ (aˆ†(t) + bˆ†(t))/√2 and aˆ†(t′)→ (aˆ†(t′) + bˆ†(t′))/√2, the above state becomes
(the creation operators bˆ† and the states |1, 0〉f , etc. are defined in C)
|φ0〉fC =
√
p0 |v〉f |dv〉C+
√
p1
2
(
|1, 0〉f + |0, 1〉f
)
|d1〉C+
√
p2
2
(
|2, 0〉f + |1, 1′〉f + |1′, 1〉f + |0, 2〉f
)
|d2〉C .
(E.3)
Upon possible further action of the adversary, the above state evolves to the normalized state
|φ0〉fC−→
∑
a,b≥0
a+b≤2
|a, b〉f |ca,b〉C = |0, 0〉f ⊗ |c0,0〉C + |1, 0〉f ⊗ |c1,0〉C + |0, 1〉f ⊗ |c0,1〉C + |2, 0〉f ⊗ |c2,0〉C
+ |1, 1′〉f ⊗ |c1,1′〉C + |1′, 1〉f ⊗ |c1′,1〉C + |0, 2〉f ⊗ |c0,2〉C . (E.4)
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where |ca,b〉C ∈ HC (not necessarily orthogonal, nor normalized states) are associated to the cases
when there are a and b photons entering Alice’s and Bob’s arms, respectively. Nevertheless, the
states |ca,b〉C are arbitrary and contain any number of photons. Therefore, the overall state before
the photon(s) enter Alice’s and Bob’s labs is
|φ0〉ABfC = |φ0〉AB ⊗ |φ0〉fC
=
1
2
(
|Dv,Dv〉+ |Dv,R〉+ |R,Dv〉+ |R,R〉
)
⊗
(
|0, 0〉 ⊗ |c0,0〉+ |1, 0〉 ⊗ |c1,0〉+ |0, 1〉 ⊗ |c0,1〉
+ |2, 0〉 ⊗ |c2,0〉+ |1, 1′〉 ⊗ |c1,1′〉+ |1′, 1〉 ⊗ |c1′,1〉+ |0, 2〉 ⊗ |c0,2〉
)
. (E.5)
Let us denote Alice’s and Bob’s respective detectors’ efficiencies as pAd and p
B
d , with p
A
` = 1 − pAd
and pB` = 1 − pBd . Therefore, in contrast to Alice’s and Bob’s actions in the ideal case (given by
Equation (D.4)), the individual actions (say, for Alice) in the practical scenario are
|Dv〉 |0〉 → |Dv〉 |0〉 , |R〉 |0〉 → |R〉 |0〉 ,
|Dv〉 |1〉 →
(√
pA` |D`〉+
√
pAd |Dc〉
)
|0〉 , |R〉 |1〉 → |R〉 |1〉 ,
|Dv〉 |2〉 →
(
pA` |D`D′`〉+
√
pA` p
A
d |DcD′`〉+
√
pA` p
A
d |D`D′c〉+ pAd |DcD′c〉
)
|0〉 , |R〉 |2〉 → |R〉 |2〉 ,
(E.6)
where primed and unprimed states of the apparatuses correspond to at times t′ and t, respectively.
Therefore, upon applying U1, given in terms of Alice’s and Bob’s local actions described by (E.6),
we obtain the state |φ1〉ABfC = U1 |φ0〉ABfC .
Following this, the adversary will apply a quantum instrument to the returning photon state
which, as before, can be modelled as an isometry, whose action is defined as
I |a′, b′〉f |ca,b〉C = |0〉S |ea,ba′,b′〉C + |1〉S |f
a,b
a′,b′〉C + |v〉S |g
a,b
a′,b′〉C + |m〉S |h
a,b
a′,b′〉C , (E.7)
where states |ea,ba′,b′〉C , |f
a,b
a′,b′〉C , |g
a,b
a′,b′〉C , |h
a,b
a′,b′〉C ∈ HC are again not necessarily normalized, nor
orthogonal. Note that, due to the action of U1, the photon numbers a, b are no longer correlated
to a′, b′ ∈ {0, 1, 2}; nevertheless, we still have a′ + b′ ≤ 2.
Again, by straightforward algebra we get |φ2〉ABSC = I |φ1〉ABfC . However, we are only inter-
ested in the key-generation rounds, i.e., we condition to the event when the server announces “1”
and neither Alice nor Bob receives a click. Hence, omitting writing the message state |1〉S , the final
density operator (without the off-diagonal terms) of the system ABC is
ρABC =
1
N
[
|Dv,R〉AB〈Dv,R| ⊗ |k0,0〉C〈k0,0|+ |R,Dv〉AB〈R,Dv| ⊗ |k1,1〉C〈k1,1|
+ |D`,R〉AB〈D`,R| ⊗ |k10,0〉C〈k10,0|+ |R,D`〉AB〈R,D`| ⊗ |k11,1〉C〈k11,1|
+ |D′`,R〉AB〈D′`,R| ⊗ |k20,0〉C〈k20,0|+ |R,D′`〉AB〈R,D′`| ⊗ |k21,1〉C〈k21,1|
+ |D`D′`,R〉AB〈D`D′`,R| ⊗ |k30,0〉C〈k30,0|+ |R,D`D′`〉AB〈R,D`D′`| ⊗ |k31,1〉C〈k31,1| (E.8)
+ |Dv,Dv〉AB〈Dv,Dv| ⊗ |k0,1〉C〈k0,1|+ |R,R〉AB〈R,R| ⊗ |k1,0〉C〈k1,0|
+ |D`,Dv〉AB〈D`,Dv| ⊗ |k10,1〉C〈k10,1|+ |Dv,D`〉AB〈Dv,D`| ⊗ |k20,1〉C〈k20,1|
+ |D`,D′`〉AB〈D`,D′`| ⊗ |k30,1〉C〈k30,1|+ |D′`,D`〉AB〈D′`,D`| ⊗ |k40,1〉C〈k40,1|
+ |D`D′`,Dv〉AB〈D`D′`,Dv| ⊗ |k50,1〉C〈k50,1|+ |Dv,D`D′`〉AB〈Dv,D`D′`| ⊗ |k60,1〉C〈k60,1|
]
.
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Note that, as before, we use commas in the states from HA⊗HB to separate the quantum numbers
defining Alice’s and Bob’s apparatus states: |D`D′`,R〉AB means that Alice opted to detect, unsuc-
cessfully (due to finite detection efficiency) the two photons present in her lab, while Bob set his
apparatus to reflect, etc. The states |ki,j〉C , etc. are associated to the cases when Alice establishes
the value i and Bob j as a key bit, and are given by
|k0,0〉 = 1
2
[
|f0,00,0 〉+ |f0,10,1 〉+ |f0,20,2 〉
]
, |k1,1〉 = 1
2
[
|f0,00,0 〉+ |f1,01,0 〉+ |f2,02,0 〉
]
,
|k10,0〉 =
1
2
√
pA`
[
|f1,00,0 〉+ |f1,10,1 〉
]
, |k11,1〉 =
1
2
√
pB`
[
|f0,10,0 〉+ |f1,11,0 〉
]
,
|k20,0〉 =
1
2
√
pA` |f1
′,1
0,1 〉 , |k21,1〉 =
1
2
√
pB` |f1,1
′
1,0 〉 ,
|k30,0〉 =
1
2
pA` |f2,00,0 〉 , |k31,1〉 =
1
2
pB` |f0,20,0 〉 ,
|k0,1〉 = 1
2
|f0,00,0 〉 , |k1,0〉 =
1
2
[ |f0,00,0 〉+ |f1,01,0 〉+ |f0,10,1 〉+ |f2,02,0 〉 ,
+ |f1,1′1,1′ 〉+ |f1
′,1
1′,1 〉+ |f0,20,2 〉
]
,
|k10,1〉 =
1
2
√
pA` |f1,00,0 〉 , |k40,1〉 =
1
2
√
pA` p
B
` |f1
′,1
0,0 〉 ,
|k20,1〉 =
1
2
√
pB` |f0,10,0 〉 , |k50,1〉 =
1
2
pA` |f2,00,0 〉 ,
|k30,1〉 =
1
2
√
pA` p
B
` |f1,1
′
0,0 〉 , |k60,1〉 =
1
2
pB` |f0,20,0 〉 .
(E.9)
The normalization constant N is, again, the probability to obtain the result “1”, when there were
no clicks at the agents’ detectors, given by
N = 〈k0,0|k0,0〉+〈k10,0|k10,0〉+〈k20,0|k20,0〉+〈k30,0|k30,0〉+〈k1,1|k1,1〉+〈k11,1|k11,1〉+〈k21,1|k21,1〉+〈k31,1|k31,1〉
+〈k0,1|k0,1〉+〈k10,1|k10,1〉+〈k20,1|k20,1〉+〈k30,1|k30,1〉+〈k40,1|k40,1〉+〈k50,1|k50,1〉+〈k60,1|k60,1〉+〈k1,0|k1,0〉 .
(E.10)
In ρABC , given by Equation (E.8), the state |Dv,R〉 〈Dv,R|, as in the ideal case, describes Alice
detecting without a click and Bob reflecting, and is associated to a shared key bit of 0. However,
|D`,R〉 〈D`,R|, |D′`,R〉 〈D′`,R| and |D`D′`,R〉 〈D`D′`,R| also correspond to a shared key bit of 0, and
are a consequence of Alice’s imperfect detector and multi-photon events. Similarly, |R,Dv〉 〈R,Dv|,
|R,D`〉 〈R,D`|, |R,D′`〉 〈R,D′`| and |R,D`D′`〉 〈R,D`D′`| are associated to a key bit 1. The remaining
states correspond to errors, i.e., when the two users establish opposite key bit values. From the
definitions of kij and N , we know that
〈k0,0|k0,0〉+ 〈k10,0|k10,0〉+ 〈k20,0|k20,0〉+ 〈k30,0|k30,0〉
N = p(Dv,R ∨D`,R ∨D
′
`,R ∨D`D′`,R|1). (E.11)
Here, by p(P|C) we denote the conditional probability that the proposition P holds (in the above
case, Alice detects and observes no clicks, while Bob reflects), given that the condition C is satisfied
(in the above case, the server announces “1”). Therefore, using the following terminology for
different probabilities (to be used in parameter estimation described in the next section), the
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probability to share the key is given by
pkey=
[〈k0,0|k0,0〉+〈k10,0|k10,0〉+〈k20,0|k20,0〉+〈k30,0|k30,0〉]+[〈k1,1|k1,1〉+〈k11,1|k11,1〉+〈k21,1|k21,1〉+〈k31,1|k31,1〉]
=
[
p0,0 + p
1
0,0 + p
2
0,0 + p
3
0,0
]
+
[
p1,1 + p
1
1,1 + p
2
1,1 + p
3
1,1
]
= p˜0,0 + p˜1,1
= p(Dv,R ∨D`,R ∨D′`,R ∨D`D′`,R ; 1) + p(R,Dv ∨R,D` ∨R,D′` ∨R,D`D′` ; 1), (E.12)
where p(Dv,R ∨D`,R ∨D′`,R ∨D`D′`,R ; 1) represents the joint probability of the following event:
Alice detects vacuum, Bob reflects, and the server announces the result “1”; and analogously for the
other term. Recall that, for simplicity, we use the semi column to denote logical AND between two
propositions, instead of introducing the additional parenthesis for the first one and the standard
symbol ∧. The probability of error in the raw key is given by
perr=
[〈k0,1|k0,1〉+〈k10,1|k10,1〉+〈k20,1|k20,1〉+〈k30,1|k30,1〉+〈k40,1|k40,1〉+〈k50,1|k50,1〉+〈k60,1|k60,1〉]+〈k1,0|k1,0〉
=
[
p0,1 + p
1
0,1 + p
2
0,1 + p
3
0,1 + p
4
0,1 + p
5
0,1 + p
6
0,1
]
+ p1,0
= p˜0,1 + p˜1,0
= p(Dv,Dv ∨D`,Dv ∨Dv,D` ∨D`,D′` ∨D′`,D` ∨Dv,D`D′` ∨D′`D`,Dv ; 1) + p(RR ; 1), (E.13)
where p(Dv,Dv ∨ D`,Dv ∨ Dv,D` ∨ D`,D′` ∨ D′`,D` ∨ Dv,D`D′` ∨ D′`D`,Dv ; 1) represents the joint
probability of the event: Alice and Bob both detect vacuum, and that the server announces the
result “1”; and analogously for the other term. Note that, the probabilities p˜i,j can be observed
from the experiment directly.
To obtain the secret key rate, we again use the bound given in [33], as
S(A|C) ≥ 〈k0,0|k0,0〉+ 〈k1,1|k1,1〉N
(
h
[ 〈k0,0|k0,0〉
〈k0,0|k0,0〉+ 〈k1,1|k1,1〉
]
− h(λ0)
)
+
〈k10,0|k10,0〉+ 〈k11,1|k11,1〉
N
(
h
[
〈k10,0|k10,0〉
〈k10,0|k10,0〉+ 〈k11,1|k11,1〉
]
− h(λ1)
)
+
〈k20,0|k20,0〉+ 〈k21,1|k21,1〉
N
(
h
[
〈k20,0|k20,0〉
〈k20,0|k20,0〉+ 〈k21,1|k21,1〉
]
− h(λ2)
)
+
〈k30,0|k30,0〉+ 〈k31,1|k31,1〉
N
(
h
[
〈k30,0|k30,0〉
〈k30,0|k30,0〉+ 〈k31,1|k31,1〉
]
− h(λ3)
)
+
〈k0,1|k0,1〉+ 〈k1,0|k1,0〉
N
(
h
[ 〈k0,1|k0,1〉
〈k0,1|k0,1〉+ 〈k1,0|k1,0〉
]
− h(λ4)
)
,
(E.14)
with λi’s defined in the analogous way as in Equation (D.14). The first four terms in S(A|C)
correspond to the keys shared between Alice and Bob, while the last term corresponds to errors
in the key. However, we estimate the lower bound on S(A|C) by considering only the first term
since its contribution to the entropy is far larger than that of any of the other terms. From the
expression (D.14) for λ0, we see that minimizing S(A|C) essentially means minimizing Re 〈k0,0|k1,1〉.
Therefore, in addition to different probabilities obtained from the experiment, we also need to
estimate Re 〈k0,0|k1,1〉. We proceed by computing the lower bound for Re2 〈k0,0|k1,1〉, i.e., for
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|Re 〈k0,0|k1,1〉 |. Notice that the lower it is, the closer to 1/2 λ0 is, i.e., the closer to 1 the h(λ0) is,
and the worst case scenario for S(A|C), has the lowest value.
Let us use the following notation for simplification,
|x〉 = |f1,01,0 〉+ |f2,02,0 〉 , |y〉 = |f0,10,1 〉+ |f0,20,2 〉 , |z〉 = |f1,1
′
1,1′ 〉+ |f1
′,1
1′,1 〉 . (E.15)
We can rewrite |k0,0〉 and |k1,1〉 from Equation (E.9), to obtain Re 〈k0,0|k1,1〉 as
Re 〈k0,0|k1,1〉 = 1
4
[
〈f0,00,0 |f0,00,0 〉+ Re 〈x|f0,00,0 〉+ Re 〈f0,00,0 |y〉+ Re 〈x|y〉
]
. (E.16)
Looking at the error term, 〈k1,0|k1,0〉 = Q/4, and with straightforward substitution from the above
into Equation (E.16), with 〈f0,00,0 |f0,00,0 〉 = 4 〈k0,1|k0,1〉 = 4p0,1, we get
〈k0,0|k1,1〉 = Q
8
+
p0,1
2
− 1
8
[〈x|x〉+ 〈y|y〉+ 〈z|z〉]− 1
4
[
〈x|z〉+ 〈y|z〉+ 〈f0,00,0 |z〉
]
. (E.17)
In the ideal case, with no vacuum or multi-photon pulses, when 〈x|x〉 = 4 〈k0,0|k0,0〉 = 4p0,0 and
〈y|y〉 = 4 〈k1,1|k1,1〉 = 4p1,1, we recover Equation (D.11). By writing 〈x|z〉 = | 〈x|z〉 |eϕx,z , we have
Re 〈x|z〉 = | 〈x|z〉 | cosϕx,y = || |x〉 || · || |z〉 || · | cosχx,z| cosϕx,z =
√
〈x|x〉
√
〈z|z〉 cos θx,z, (E.18)
where χx,z denotes the angle between |x〉 and |z〉 and cos θx,z ≡ | cosχx,z| cosϕx,z, and analogously
for Re 〈y|z〉 and so on. Therefore, the final expression for Re 〈k0,0|k1,1〉 is
Re 〈k0,0|k1,1〉 = Q
8
+
p0,1
2
− 1
8
[〈x|x〉+ 〈y|y〉+ 〈z|z〉]− 1
4
[√
〈f0,00,0 |f0,00,0 〉
√
〈z|z〉 cos θf,z
]
−1
4
[√
〈x|x〉
√
〈z|z〉 cos θx,z +
√
〈y|y〉
√
〈z|z〉 cos θy,z
]
. (E.19)
To obtain 〈x|x〉 and 〈y|y〉, consider again |k0,0〉 and |k1,1〉 from Equation (E.9)
〈k1,1|k1,1〉= 1
4
[
〈f0,00,0 |f0,00,0 〉+ 〈x|x〉+ 2Re 〈f0,00,0 |x〉
]
, 〈k0,0|k0,0〉= 1
4
[
〈f0,00,0 |f0,00,0 〉+ 〈y|y〉+ 2Re 〈f0,00,0 |y〉
]
.
(E.20)
Note that 〈f0,00,0 |f0,00,0 〉 = 4 〈k0,1|k0,1〉 = 4p0,1, 〈k0,0|k0,0〉 = p0,0 and 〈k1,1|k1,1〉 = p1,1. Therefore,
solving the quadratic equations obtained from (E.20), we get the following positive roots of
√〈x|x〉
and
√〈y|y〉, √〈x|x〉 = 2 [−√p0,1 cosθx,f +√p1,1 − (1− cos2θx,f ) p0,1 ] ,√〈y|y〉 = 2 [−√p0,1 cosθy,f +√p0,0 − (1− cos2θy,f ) p0,1 ] . (E.21)
Analogously, for 〈z|z〉 we have
〈z|z〉+ 2
[√
〈x|x〉 cos θx,z +
√
〈y|y〉 cos θy,z + 2√p0,1 cos θf,z]︸ ︷︷ ︸
β
√〈z|z〉
+ 4
[
p0,1 − p1,0
]
+
[
〈x|x〉+ 〈y|y〉+ 2√〈x|x〉√〈y|y〉 cos θx,y]
+ 4
√
p0,1
[√
〈x|x〉 cos θx,f +
√
〈y|y〉 cos θy,f
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
γ
= 0,
(E.22)
where cos θx,z ≡ | cosχx,z| cosϕx,z and analogously for cos θy,z, cos θf,z, etc. Again, solving the
above quadratic equation, we can obtain the positive root of
√〈z|z〉.
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E.2 Parameter estimation
Here, we briefly explain how to estimate the relevant probabilities, p0,0,p1,1 and p0,1, to compute
S(A|C) in Equation (E.14), to eventually obtain the secret key rate in Equation (C.1).
Due to the nature of this protocol, in the ideal case, one can only expect p(1) = 1/8, which
is further reduced in the experimental case of imperfect detectors, etc. Therefore, it is useful if
these probabilities could be computed without sacrificing any key-generation rounds. Below, we
discuss the case with direct estimation where Alice and Bob use part of the key to obtain these
probabilities, as well as the case of indirect estimation where no key-generation rounds are wasted.
E.2.1 Direct estimation
Here, we sacrifice µ instances of the total Nraw key-generation rounds, to directly compute the
relevant probabilities. However, since Alice’s and Bob’s detectors are imperfect, they cannot com-
pute p0,0 = p(Dv,R ; 1) and p1,1 = p(R,Dv ; 1) directly, as they cannot differentiate the event Dv,R
from the events D`,R, D
′
`,R and D`D
′
`,R, and analogously for R,Dv. However, they can obtain
p˜0,0 = p0,0 + p
1
0,0 + p
2
0,0 + p
3
0,0 = p(Dv,R ∨D`,R ∨D′`,R ∨D`D′`,R ; 1) directly, and also p˜1,1. They
can then compute p10,0 = 〈k10,0|k10,0〉, p20,0 = 〈k20,0|k20,0〉 and p30,0 = 〈k30,0|k30,0〉, to eventually obtain
p0,0. From Equation (E.9) one has
p10,0 = p(D`,R ; 1) =
pA`
4
(
|| |f1,00,0 〉+ |f1,1
′
0,1′ 〉 ||2
)
, p20,0 = p(D
′
`,R ; 1) =
pA`
4
〈f1′,10,1 |f1
′,1
0,1 〉 ,
p30,0 = p(D`D
′
`,R ; 1) =
pA
2
`
4
〈f2,00,0 |f2,00,0 〉 . (E.23)
Even though Alice and Bob cannot compute the above probabilities, they can estimate them by
looking at the events corresponding to the clicks, using the expressions
p(Dc,R ; 1) =
pAd
4
(
|| |f1,00,0 〉+ |f1,1
′
0,1′ 〉 ||2
)
, p(D′c,R ; 1) =
pAd
4
〈f1′,10,1 |f1
′,1
0,1 〉 ,
p(DcD
′
c,R ; 1) =
pA
2
d
4
〈f2,00,0 |f2,00,0 〉 . (E.24)
Therefore, we can write
(
p10,0 + p
2
0,0
)
and p30,0 as
p10,0 + p
2
0,0 =
(
pA`
pAd
)
p(Dc,R ∨D′c,R ; 1), p30,0 =
(
pA`
pAd
)2
p(DcD
′
c,R ; 1), (E.25)
where only p(DcD
′
c,R ; 1) can be obtained using the rounds when Alice gets double clicks in her
detector. However, p(Dc,R∨D′c,R∨D`D′c,R∨DcD′`,R ; 1), corresponding to a single click in Alice’s
detector, can also be obtained directly. Hence,
p(Dc,R∨D′c,R ; 1) = p(Dc,R∨D′c,R∨D`D′c,R∨DcD′`,R ; 1)−p(D`D′c,R ; 1)−p(DcD′`,R ; 1). (E.26)
Also, we have
p(D`D
′
c,R ; 1) =
pA` p
A
d
4
〈f2,00,0 |f2,00,0 〉 = p(DcD′`,R ; 1). (E.27)
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Therefore, the required probabilities p0,0 and p1,1 are
p0,0 = p˜0,0 −
(
pA`
pAd
)
p(Dc,R ∨D′c,R ∨D`D′c,R ∨DcD′`,R ; 1) +
(
pA`
pAd
)2
p(DcD
′
c,R ; 1),
p1,1 = p˜1,1 −
(
pB`
pBd
)
p(R,Dc ∨R,D′c ∨R,D`D′c ∨R,DcD′` ; 1) +
(
pB`
pBd
)2
p(DcD
′
c,R ; 1).
(E.28)
Additionally, to compute p0,1, required to estimate Re 〈k0,0|k1,1〉 from Equation (E.19), we use
p0,1 = p˜0,1 − p10,1 − p20,1 − p30,1 − p40,1 − p50,1 − p60,1. Again, using straightforward algebra, we have
p0,1 = p˜0,1 −
(
pA`
pAd
)
p(Dc,Dv ∨Dc,D′` ∨D′c,D` ∨DcD′`,Dv ∨D`D′c,Dv ; 1)
−
(
pB`
pBd
)
p(Dv,Dc ∨D`,D′c ∨D′`,Dc ∨Dv,DcD′` ∨Dv,D`D′c ; 1) (E.29)
− 3
(
pA`
pAd
)2
p(DcD
′
c,Dv ; 1)− 3
(
pB`
pBd
)2
p(Dv,DcD
′
c ; 1)− 3
(
pA` p
B
`
pAd p
B
d
)
p(Dc,D
′
c ∨D′c,Dc ; 1).
Using the direct estimation method to compute all the relevant probabilities, we obtain the
secret key rate r (from Equation (C.1)) in Figure 5. We consider the implemented number of
rounds, 105, as a subset of a larger implementation and, therefore, use them to estimate the secret
key rate. The probability of server announcing “1” during these rounds is, p(1) = 0.0162. Therefore,
the amount of keys wasted during the parameter estimations is 1620 bits.
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Figure 5: Secret key rate, r, vs number of rounds, N , for the case of imperfect single-photon sources
and detectors. The probability necessary for the plot are obtained from the experimental data.
The probabilities of Equations (E.28) and (E.29) are the following: p0,0 = (7.3 ± 0.3) × 10−3,
p1,1 = (5.5± 0.3)× 10−3, p0,1 = (1.1± 0.9)× 10−4 and p1,0 = (5.1± 0.7)× 10−4.
We assume  = 10−5, EC = 10−10 and PE = 10−11. The value ′ is a factor in the min-entropy
expression used for the key rate computation and may actually be set by the user arbitrarily
to maximize the key rate (see Lemma 1 from [32]). However, for our evaluations we simply set
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′ = 10−7 (optimizing this could only improve our results). For parameter estimation, we take
PE = 10
−11 and assume a confidence interval δ = 10−4, given our experimental errors. The
calculated secret key rate corresponds to the minimum lower bound of the entropy S(A|C) (see
Equation (E.14)) over the confidence interval of the experimental probabilities. This minimum
occurs for the highest value of the error probability perr and the lowest of pkey, and therefore
represents the worst possible key rate within our experimental uncertainty.
We also stress that these results are lower-bounds. The actual key rate could be significantly
higher. Indeed, to compute these lower bounds we took advantage of the strong sub-additivity of von
Neumann entropy by actually discarding several components of the entropy function (components
which would only have increased Eve’s uncertainty - thus by discarding them, we are giving an
unrealistic advantage to the adversary causing the key rate to drop). Such a method gives a
worst-case computation and the actual key rate will be better.
E.2.2 Indirect estimation
To avoid wasting the rounds used for key-generation (when “1” was announced without any clicks at
Alice’s and Bob’s detectors), we can use the remaining rounds (when “0”,“v” or “m” was announced
or “1” was announced with click(s) at Alice’s and Bob’s detectors) for parameter estimation. For
these cases, Alice and Bob can communicate over an authenticated channel to convey their respec-
tive action choices and resulting states to each other. Therefore, they can communicate for the
non-useful rounds where server announces “0”,“v” or “m”, as well as the rounds where any of them
detects a photon in case the server announces “1”. This method can be applied also in the ideal
case described in section D, but we present it only once for brevity.
We know that p0,0 = p(Dv,R ; 1) = p(Dv,R) − p(Dv,R ; 0) − p(Dv,R ; v) − p(Dv,R ;m),
where p(Dv,R) = p(D,R)− p(D`,R)− p(D′`,R)− p(Dc,R)− p(D′c,R)− p(D`D′`,R)− p(DcD′`,R)−
p(D`D
′
c,R) − p(DcD′c,R). Note that, p(D,R) is the probability of Alice choosing to detect and
Bob to reflect. Since Alice and Bob choose their actions at random, ideally p(D,D) = p(D,R) =
p(R,D) = p(R,R) = 1/4. However, considering the finite sample size and the inefficiency of switch-
ing between the actions, Alice and Bob do not take these probabilities to be 1/4 but compute them
considering only the non-useful rounds. Therefore, we have
p0,0 = p(D,R)− p(D`,R)− p(D′`,R)− p(Dc,R)− p(D′c,R)− p(D`D′`,R)− p(DcD′`,R)
− p(D`D′c,R)− p(DcD′c,R)− p(Dv,R ; 0)− p(Dv,R ; v)− p(Dv,R ;m). (E.30)
Note that Alice and Bob cannot directly compute all the quantities from the above expression, say,
p(Dv,R ; 0), p(Dv,R ; 1), etc. They can compute p(D`,R), p(D
′
`,R) and p(DcD
′
`,R) analogously as
in the previous subsection, Equations (E.25). However, p(Dc,R ∨D′c,R ∨D`D′c,R ∨DcD′`,R) can
be computed directly. We use p(Dv,R∨D`,R∨D′`,R∨D`D′`,R ; 0), directly observable, to estimate
p(Dv,R ; 0). Therefore,
p(Dv,R ; 0)= p(Dv,R ∨D`,R ∨D′`,R ∨D`D′`,R ; 0)− p(D`,R ; 0)− p(D′`,R ; 0)− p(D`D′`,R ; 0), (E.31)
p(D`,R ; 0), p(D
′
`,R ; 0) and p(DcD
′
`,R ; 0), etc., can again be computed in the same way as before.
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Therefore, the final expressions for p0,0 and p1,1, in terms of probabilities computed indirectly, are
p0,0 = p(D,R)− p(Dc,R ∨D′c,R ∨D`D′c,R ∨DcD′`,R)− p(DcD′c,R)− p(Dv,R ∨D`,R ∨D′`,R ∨D`D′`,R ; 0)
− p(Dv,R ∨D`,R ∨D′`,R ∨D`D′`,R ; v)− p(Dv,R ∨D`,R ∨D′`,R ∨D`D′`,R ;m)
+
(
pA`
pAd
)[
p(Dc,R ∨D′c,R ∨D`D′c,R ∨DcD′`,R ; 0) + p(Dc,R ∨D′c,R ∨D`D′c,R ∨DcD′`,R ; v)
+ p(Dc,R ∨D′c,R ∨D`D′c,R ∨DcD′`,R ;m)− p(Dc,R ∨D′c,R ∨D`D′c,R ∨DcD′`,R)
]
−
(
pA`
pAd
)2 [
p(DcD
′
c,R ; 0) + p(DcD
′
c,R ; v) + p(DcD
′
c,R ;m)− p(DcD′c,R)
]
, (E.32)
p1,1 = p(R,D)− p(R,Dc∨R,D′c ∨R,D`D′c ∨R,DcD′`)− p(R,DcD′c)− p(R,Dv ∨R,D` ∨R,D′` ∨R,D`D′` ; 0)
− p(R,Dv ∨R,D` ∨R,D′` ∨R,D`D′` ; v)− p(R,Dv ∨R,D` ∨R,D′` ∨R,D`D′` ;m)
+
(
pB`
pBd
)[
p(R,Dc ∨R,D′c ∨R,D`D′c ∨R,DcD′` ; 0) + p(R,Dc ∨R,D′c ∨R,D`D′c ∨R,DcD′` ; v)
+ p(R,Dc ∨R,D′c ∨R,D`D′c ∨R,DcD′` ;m)− p(R,Dc ∨R,D′c ∨R,D`D′c ∨R,DcD′`)
]
−
(
pB`
pBd
)2 [
p(R,DcD
′
c ; 0) + p(R,DcD
′
c ; v) + p(R,DcD
′
c ;m)− p(R,DcD′c)
]
. (E.33)
We can analogously estimate p0,1 by computing p˜1,0 as
p˜1,0 = p(R,R ; 1) = p(RR)− p(R,R ; 0)− p(R,R ; v)− p(R,R ;m). (E.34)
Therefore,
p0,1 = p(1)− p˜0,0 − p˜1,1 − p˜1,0 −
(
pA`
pAd
)
p(Dc,Dv ∨Dc,D′` ∨D′c,D` ∨DcD′`,Dv ∨D`D′c,Dv ; 1)
−
(
pB`
pBd
)
p(Dv,Dc ∨D`,D′c ∨D′`,Dc ∨Dv,DcD′` ∨Dv,D`D′c ; 1) (E.35)
− 3
(
pA`
pAd
)2
p(DcD
′
c,Dv ; 1)− 3
(
pB`
pBd
)2
p(Dv,DcD
′
c ; 1)− 3
(
pA` p
B
`
pAd p
B
d
)
p(Dc,D
′
c ∨D′c,Dc ; 1).
Note that, to compute pkey = p˜00 + p˜11 using the indirect method, we have
p˜0,0 = p(D,R)− p(Dc,R ∨D′c,R ∨D`D′c,R ∨DcD′`,R)− p(DcD′c,R)− p(Dv,R ∨D`,R ∨D′`,R ∨D`D′`,R ; 0)
− p(Dv,R ∨D`,R ∨D′`,R ∨D`D′`,R ; v)− p(Dv,R ∨D`,R ∨D′`,R ∨D`D′`,R ;m), (E.36)
p˜1,1 = p(R,D)− p(R,Dc ∨R,D′c ∨R,D`D′c ∨R,DcD′`)− p(R,DcD′c)− p(R,Dv ∨R,D` ∨R,D′` ∨R,D`D′` ; 0)
− p(R,Dv ∨R,D` ∨R,D′` ∨R,D`D′` ; v)− p(R,Dv ∨R,D` ∨R,D′` ∨R,D`D′` ;m). (E.37)
From our experimental data, we obtain p0,0 = (8 ± 2) × 10−3, p1,1 = (6 ± 2) × 10−3, p0,1 =
(3 ± 2) × 10−3 and p1,0 = (0.5 ± 2) × 10−3. All these values are compatible with those obtained
with the direct estimation within experimental uncertainties, which can be reduced by employing
a larger sample and improving the single-photon sources and detectors.
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E.3 Verification
As for the ideal case, Alice and Bob need to verify that the state received from the server matches
their expectation. In order to do that, they must estimate the probabilities p0,p1 and p2 of
Equation (E.3) and verify that they correspond to what the server declared. This task can be
again performed by considering the cases where one or both users got click(s) upon choosing to
detect the incoming photon(s). Considering, for instance, the cases when they both chose to detect,
one can use Equations (E.5) and (E.6) to obtain the expression for |φ1〉ABfC = U1 |φ0〉ABfC , to see
that
p(DcD
′
c,Dv) =
(
pAd
2
)2
〈c2,0|c2,0〉 , p(Dv,DcD′c) =
(
pBd
2
)2
〈c0,2|c0,2〉 ,
p(Dc,D
′
c ∨D′c,Dc) =
pAd p
B
d
4
(〈c1,1′ |c1,1′〉+ 〈c1′,1|c1′,1〉) , (E.38)
where p(DcD
′
c,Dv) is the probability that Alice observed two clicks and Bob none, when they both
chose to detect. Similarly, p(Dc,D
′
c ∨D′c,Dc) corresponds to the case when Alice and Bob observed
one click each. Note that the logical OR operation is between Dc,D
′
c and D
′
c,Dc, and not just
between D′c and D′c – it is the probability of the union of two events, each describing both Alice’s
and Bob’s states of the apparatus. Hence, they can easily obtain p2 using
p2 = 〈c2,0|c2,0〉+ 〈c1,1′ |c1,1′〉+ 〈c1′,1|c1′,1〉+ 〈c0,2|c0,2〉 , (E.39)
as well as verify if 〈c1,1′ |c1,1′〉 ≈ 〈c1′,1|c1′,1〉 ≈ 〈c2,0|c2,0〉 ≈ 〈c0,2|c0,2〉. Analogously, they can obtain
p1 = 〈c1,0|c1,0〉+ 〈c0,1|c0,1〉 by noticing that
p(Dc,Dv ∨Dc,D′` ∨D′c,D` ∨DcD′`,Dv ∨D`D′c,Dv) =
(
pAd
4
)
〈c1,0|c1,0〉
+
(
pAd p
B
`
4
)(〈c1,1′ |c1,1′〉+ 〈c1′,1|c1′,1〉+ 2 〈c2,0|c2,0〉), (E.40)
p(Dv,Dc ∨D′`,Dc ∨D`,D′c ∨Dv,DcD′` ∨Dv,D`D′c) =
(
pBd
4
)
〈c0,1|c0,1〉
+
(
pA` p
B
d
4
)(〈c1,1′ |c1,1′〉+ 〈c1′,1|c1′,1〉+ 2 〈c0,2|c0,2〉), (E.41)
where p(Dc,Dv ∨ Dc,D′` ∨ D′c,D` ∨ DcD′`,Dv ∨ D`D′c,Dv) is the probability that Alice observed 1
click and Bob none, when they both chose to detect.
We apply the described procedure and obtain p0 = 0.72, p1 = 0.16, p2 = 0.12. Our source
emits on average 0.35 photons per round (0.5 s). Assuming poissonian statistics of emission with
that average, we should obtain p0 = 0.70, p1 = 0.25, p2 = 0.04. The discrepancy between the
measured and the expected values can be attributed to a deviation from poissonian statistics, due
to fluctuations in the source parameters (temperature, pump wavelength, etc.) while taking the
measurement, which lasted about 30 hours.
Except for that verification, Alice and Bob can also check if the server’s announcements are
compatible with their actions, as in Table 2. In this case, however, experimental imperfections allow
the server for multiple announcements for the same actions of the users. If all the experimental
parameters, such as losses, splitting ratios of beam splitters, etc., are characterized prior of the
beginning of the protocol, Alice and Bob can still verify the honesty of the server by comparing the
statistics of the server announcements with what they expect from the properties of the set-up.
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F Dependence on detection efficiency
In this section, we discuss the dependence of the secret key rate on the detection efficiencies of
Alice’s and Bob’s detectors, pAd and p
B
d , respectively. Note that, since we only consider the first
term in Equation (E.14) to estimate a bound on S(A|C), we only need to compute the probabilities
p0,0, p1,1, p0,1, p1,0 and p(1). However, p0,0,p1,1,p0,1,p1,0 are independent of p
A
d and p
B
d , and it
is only p(1) that has this dependence. Therefore, using the experimental data corresponding to
pA` = 1− pAd = 0.42 and pB` = 1− pBd = 0.42, we can rewrite p(1) with the explicit dependence on
the general parameters, p˜A` and p˜
B
` , as
N (p˜A` , p˜B` ) = 〈k0,0|k0,0〉+
√
p˜A`
pA`
(〈k10,0|k10,0〉+〈k20,0|k20,0〉)+( p˜A`pA`
)
〈k30,0|k30,0〉
+ 〈k1,1|k1,1〉+
√
p˜B`
pB`
(〈k11,1|k11,1〉+〈k21,1|k21,1〉)+( p˜B`pB`
)
〈k31,1|k31,1〉
+ 〈k0,1|k0,1〉+ 〈k1,0|k1,0〉+
√
p˜A`
pA`
〈k10,1|k10,1〉+
√
p˜B`
pB`
〈k20,1|k20,1〉
+
√
p˜A` p˜
B
`
pA` p
B
`
(〈k30,1|k30,1〉+〈k40,1|k40,1〉)+( p˜A`pA`
)
〈k50,1|k50,1〉+
(
p˜B`
pB`
)
〈k60,1|k60,1〉
= p(1)(p˜A` , p˜
B
` ).
(F.1)
Moreover, perr = p(1)− pkey is also modified accordingly, to be used in computing Q = perr/p(1)
to obtain the secret key rate (C.1).
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